As yet untouched by the war, the inhabitants of Singapore had been lulled into a false sense of security by the belief that the island was an invincible fortress. Ever since Thomas Stamford Raffles had claimed the island for the UK in 1819 people had believed that an attack would come only from the sea, and that Singapore was impregnable.
But seventeen months before the eventual fall of the island on 15 February 1942, the Planning Chief of Imperial Army Headquarters in Tokyo, explored the island and part of the Malayan peninsula. He reached the conclusion that attack from the sea was pointless. The decision was made even then that the attack must come from the north - down the peninsula and across to the island.
Not all members of the armed forces were so naive as to believe in the impregnability of Singapore, but many requests for more men, equipment, ammunition and modern aircraft could not be filled. Others were simply ignored, for the authorities were reluctant to reveal to the civilian population the true state of affairs.
Was the loss of Singapore a gigantic blunder or the result of a miscalculated gamble?